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Abstract	 Koskinen H. Pharmaceutical expenditures, the reference price system and com­
petition in the pharmaceutical market. A register study. Helsinki: The Social 
Insurance Institution of Finland, Studies in social security and health 150, 2018. 
132 pp. ISBN 978-952-284-039-4 (print), 978-952-284-040-0 (pdf). 
This study examines the impact of the implementation of a ge­
neric reference price system on pharmaceutical prices and com­
petition within the market. The focus is particularly on antipsy­
chotic medications. Furthermore, the impact of reference pricing 
on previously implemented generic substitution is assessed. An­
tipsychotics and antidepressants were, in terms of value, among 
the fastest growing pharmaceutical groups in Finland at the turn 
of the 21st century. For antipsychotics, most of the cost growth 
resulted from the rise in the mean daily cost of treatment, whereas 
the main reason for antidepressant cost growth was the increased 
number of patients. The implementation of reference pricing de­
creased the daily cost of the studied antipsychotics. The decreases 
ranged from 30% to 66% in the short term and from 25% to 51% 
in the medium-to-long term. When the study was extended to 
other pharmaceutical groups, the average decrease was 35% at the 
end of the first year, 56% at the end of the second year and 60% 
at the end of the third year. However, there were large differences 
in the size of the decrease between groups. Being included in the 
reference price system had the largest decreasing impact on prices. 
However, the reference price system’s impact on prices appeared to 
be waning; the later an active substance was included in the sys­
tem, the higher the price level remained. In addition, the impact 
of the reference price system on previously implemented generic 
substitution remained low, and 2.5 years after the implementation 
of the reference price system it was almost non-existent. Generic 
pharmaceutical markets are highly concentrated in Finland. In ad­
dition, there is an overall lack of transparency in the pharmaceuti­
cal distribution chain. Further research is needed on the barriers 
of entry and on the role different operators of the pharmaceutical 
distribution chain have in promoting price competition in the ge­
neric market sector. 
Keywords: reference prices; systems; generic substitution; prices; 
competition; drugs, generic; generic products; medicines; antipsy­
chotic agents; market; costs 
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Tiivistelmä Koskinen H. Lääkekustannukset, viitehintajärjestelmä ja kilpailu lääkemarkki­
noilla. Rekisteritutkimus. Helsinki: Kela, Sosiaali- ja terveysturvan tutkimuksia 
150, 2018. 132 s. ISBN 978-952-284-039-4 (nid.), 978-952-284-040-0 (pdf). 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan geneerisen viitehintajärjestelmän 
käyttöönoton vaikutusta lääkkeiden hintoihin ja markkinoilla 
esiintyvään kilpailuun. Lisäksi arvioidaan viitehintajärjestelmän 
tuomaa lisähyötyä suhteessa aikaisemmin käyttöönotettuun lää­
kevaihtoon. Erityisesti tarkastellaan psykoosilääkkeitä, jotka olivat 
2000-luvun vaihteessa masennuslääkkeiden tapaan kustannuksis­
sa mitaten eräs nopeimmin kasvavista lääkeryhmistä Suomessa. 
Suurin osa psykoosilääkkeiden kustannusten kasvusta johtui kes­
kimääräisen hoitopäiväkustannuksen noususta. Masennuslääk­
keiden kustannuskasvua taas selitti lisääntynyt potilaiden määrä. 
Viitehintajärjestelmän käyttöönotto pienensi psykoosilääkkeiden 
hoitopäivän kustannusta lyhyellä aikavälillä 30‒66 prosenttia ja pi­
demmällä aikavälillä 25‒51 prosenttia. Kun tarkastelua laajennet­
tiin muihin lääkeryhmiin, oli keskimääräinen lasku vuoden pääs­
tä 35 prosenttia, kahden vuoden päästä 56 prosenttia ja kolmen 
vuoden päästä 60 prosenttia. Lääkeryhmien välillä oli kuitenkin 
suuria eroja. Itse viitehintajärjestelmään liittämisellä oli merkittä­
vin vaikutus sen piiriin kuuluvien valmisteiden hintoihin. Järjes­
telmän kyky vaikuttaa hintoihin näytti kuitenkin hiipuvan: mitä 
myöhemmin lääkeaine liitettiin järjestelmään, sitä korkeampana 
sen hintataso pysyi. Lisäksi viitehintajärjestelmän tuoma lisä­
hyöty suhteessa aikaisemmin käyttöönotettuun lääkevaihtoon oli 
vähäinen. 2,5 vuotta viitehintajärjestelmän käyttöönoton jälkeen 
lisähyöty oli lähes olematon. Geneeriset lääkemarkkinat ovat Suo­
messa erittäin keskittyneet, ja lääkkeiden jakeluketjun läpinäky­
vyydessä on puutteita. Markkinoille pääsyn esteet ja jakeluketjun 
eri toimijoiden roolit kilpailun edistämisessä vaativat vielä lisää 
tutkimusta. 
Avainsanat: viitehinnat; järjestelmät; lääkevaihto; hinnat; kilpailu; 
geneeriset lääkkeet; rinnakkaisvalmisteet; lääkkeet; psykoosilääk­
keet; markkinat; kustannukset 
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Sammandrag Koskinen H. Läkemedelskostnader, referensprissystemet och konkurrens på 
läkemedelsmarknaden. En registerstudie. Helsingfors: FPA, Social trygghet och 
hälsa, undersökningar 150, 2018. 132 s. ISBN 978-952-284-039-4 (hft.), 978­
952-284-040-0 (pdf). 
I denna studie undersöktes effekten av införandet av det generiska 
referensprissystemet på läkemedelspriserna och konkurrensen på 
marknaden med särskild inriktning på antipsykotiska läkemedel. 
Vidare utvärderades den positiva effekten av referensprissättning 
på den tidigare implementerade generisk substitutionen. Antipsy­
kotiska och antidepressiva läkemedel hörde till de snabbast väx­
ande läkemedelsgrupperna i Finland i början av 2000-talet. I fråga 
om antipsykotiska läkemedel berodde största delen av kostnads­
ökningen på att den genomsnittliga kostnaden för en vårddag 
steg. I fråga om antidepressiva läkemedel var orsaken till kost­
nadsökningen att antalet patienter ökade. Införandet av referens­
prissystemet minskade den dagliga kostnaden för  antipsykotiska 
läkemedel med mellan 30 % och 66 % på kort sikt och med mellan 
25 % och 51 % på medellång till lång sikt. När studien utvidgades 
till andra läkemedelsgrupper var den genomsnittliga minskningen 
35 % vid slutet av det första året, 56 % vid slutet av det andra året 
och 60 % vid slutet av det tredje året. Det fanns dock stora skillna­
der i storleken på minskningen mellan olika läkemedelsgrupper. 
Den faktiska upptagningen i referensprissystemet hade den största 
minskande effekten på priserna. Referensprissystemets inverkan 
på priserna var dock avtagande. Ju senare en aktiv substans ingick 
i referensprissystemet, desto högre förblev prisnivån. Dessutom 
var den positiva effekten av referensprissystemet jämfört med den 
tidigare implementerade generiska substitutionen låg. Två och ett 
halvt år efter att ett läkemedel upptagits i referensprissystemet var 
effekten nästan obefintligt. De generiska läkemedelsmarknaderna 
i Finland är starkt koncentrerade. Dessutom finns det en övergri­
pande brist på transparens i läkemedelsdistributionskedjan. Ytter­
ligare forskning behövs om inträdesbarriärer och olika aktörers 
roll i distributionskedjan. 
Nyckelord: referenspriser; system; läkemedelsutbyte; priser; 
konkurrens; generiska läkemedel; synonympreparat; läkemedel; 
antipsykosmedel; marknaden; kostnader 
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Terms and abbreviations 
Active substance
ATC 
DDD
EFPIA 
EMA 
EU 
Fimea 
Generic 
medicine
GRP 
GS 
HHI 
Kela 
An ingredient that alone or in combination with one or more oth­
er ingredients is considered to be responsible for the therapeutic 
effect of a medicine (WHO Collaborating Centre for Pricing and 
Reimbursement Policies 2016). 
The Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classification. A classifica­
tion system where the active substances are divided into differ­
ent groups according to the organ or system on which they act 
and their therapeutic, chemical and pharmacological properties. 
(The WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodol­
ogy 2018.) 
Defined daily dose. The assumed average maintenance dose per 
day for a drug used for its main indication in adults. (WHO Col­
laborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology 2018.) 
The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and As­
sociations 
The European Medicines Agency 
The European Union 
The Finnish Medicines Agency (formerly: the National Agency 
for Medicines) 
A pharmaceutical product with the same qualitative and quanti­
tative composition in an active substance and the same form as 
the reference medicine, and whose bioequivalence with the ref­
erence medicine has been demonstrated (WHO Collaborating 
Centre for Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 2016). 
Generic reference pricing. A reimbursement policy in which 
products containing the same active ingredient are clustered into 
a reference group. The third party payer funds at maximum to the 
reference price, while the patient must pay the difference between 
the purchasing price and the reference price, in addition to any 
co-payments. (WHO Collaborating Centre for Pricing and Reim­
bursement Policies 2016.) 
Generic substitution. The practice of substituting a medicine with 
a less expensive medicine containing the same active ingredient/-s. 
Generic substitution is either allowed or required. (WHO Col­
laborating Centre for Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 2016.) 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. A statistical measure of mar­
ket concentration and competition among market participants. 
It is calculated by summing the squares of the percentage market 
shares held by the market participants. Also known as the Herfin­
dahl Index. (US Department of Justice 2015.) 
The Social Insurance Institution of Finland 
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MAH	 Marketing authorization holder. Holds the authorization to place 
and keep a medicine on the market. (WHO Collaborating Centre 
for Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 2016.) 
NHI	 The National Health Insurance 
Originator 	 The first version of a medicine. Developed and patented by an 
medicine	 originator pharmaceutical company, which has exclusive rights to 
market the product for the duration of the patent or other exclu­
sivity rights. Often also referred to as brand medicines. (WHO 
Collaborating Centre for Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 
2016.) 
Pharmaceutical 	 Grouping of active substances according to the organ or system 
group	 on which they act, and according to their chemical, pharmaco­
logical and therapeutic properties. (WHO Collaborating Centre 
for Drug Statistics Methodology 2018.) 
Reference price	 A reimbursement ceiling, or the price up to which a third party 
payer is willing to pay reimbursement for. (WHO Collaborating 
Centre for Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 2016.) 
RPS	 A reference price system. A reimbursement policy in which iden­
tical medicines or similar medicines are clustered into reference 
groups. The third party payer funds at maximum to the reference 
price, while the patient must pay the difference between the pur­
chasing price and the reference price, in addition to any co-pay­
ments. (WHO Collaborating Centre for Pricing and Reimburse­
ment Policies 2016.) 
TRP	 Therapeutic reference pricing. A reimbursement policy in which 
chemically related, pharmacologically equivalent products or 
products with similar therapeutic effect are clustered into refer­
ence groups. The third party payer funds at maximum to the ref­
erence price, while the patient must pay the difference between 
the purchasing price and the reference price, in addition to any 
co-payments. (WHO Collaborating Centre for Pricing and Reim­
bursement Policies 2016.) 
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 1 Introduction 
According to Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, the invisible hand of 
the competitive market results in more benefits to a society than any markets with 
government-regulated prices could hope for (Smith 1776). However, as pharmaceu­
tical markets demonstrate a high number of market distortions, price competition 
within the market is inefficient and many governments have felt the need to step in 
and regulate pharmaceutical prices in one way or another (Rice 1998; Mossialos et al. 
2004; WHO 2012). 
One example of pharmaceutical price regulation is reference pricing. In a reference 
price system, third party payers set a reimbursement threshold for a group of prod­
ucts regarded as interchangeable. The purpose is to promote competition between 
pharmaceutical companies and to encourage consumers to make rational decisions. 
In a reference price system, regulators attempt to mimic competitive markets by cre­
ating incentives for physicians and patients to be price sensitive. This, in return, pre­
sumably encourages price competition between pharmaceutical companies. How­
ever, it has been debated whether pharmaceutical price regulation, such as reference 
pricing, actually hinders competition within the market (Garattini and Tediosi 2000; 
Danzon and Chao 2000; Danzon and Ketcham 2004). Some argue that reference 
pricing does not provide much incentive for generic manufacturers to price their 
products or for pharmacists to sell generic pharmaceuticals below the reference price. 
This may reduce price competition in the end. (Anis et al. 2003; Miraldo 2009.) On 
the other hand, it has been suggested that countries with less strict price regulation 
have higher prices than countries with strict price regulation (Kanavos et al. 2008). 
Typically, reference pricing is applied to off-patent markets. After an originator prod­
uct’s patent expires, generic products can enter the market and start to compete for 
a share. The diffusion of generic products and price reductions are interlocked; mar­
kets with a high share of generics typically show larger decreases in prices than mar­
kets with a low share of generics (Dylst and Simoens 2011). It is often difficult to 
predict generic entry after the loss of exclusivity rights. There is some evidence that 
companies tend to enter markets with supply and demand characteristics similar to 
the company’s existing pharmaceuticals, and to markets where they have prior exper­
tise in either distribution or manufacturing. There is also evidence that larger market 
areas and markets with more hospital sales and products that treat chronic condi­
tions attract more entry. (Scott Morton 1999.) 
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Finland was facing financial hard­
ship and there was a need to contain public spending. Primarily taxation-financed 
reimbursement expenditures also came under scrutiny. The increased demand for 
health care, including pharmaceuticals, the aging population and the adoption of 
new, often expensive pharmaceuticals all contributed to rising pharmaceutical ex­
penditures. While some measures, including the implementation of generic substitu­
Pharmaceutical expenditures, the reference price system and competition in the pharmaceutical market 15 
tion in 2003, were already taken, a need for further cost containment existed. (Gov­
ernment proposal 100/2008.) This lead to Finland adopting a generic reference price 
system in April 2009. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of a reference price system on 
prices and competition within the market. A special focus is on antipsychotics, which 
were one of the pharmaceutical groups where outpatient expenditures were growing 
particularly fast before the implementation of the reference price system. In Chap­
ters 2 and 3, the pharmaceutical sector, rising pharmaceutical expenditures and cost 
containment are discussed. Chapter 4 introduces the reimbursement and pricing sys­
tem in Finland, together with the reference price system. Chapter 5 provides a discus­
sion on the competitive conditions of the generic pharmaceutical market in Finland. 
This is followed by a review of previous literature on the impact of a reference price 
system on prices (Chapter 6). In Chapters 7 and 8, the rationale and the aims of this 
study are introduced. An introduction to materials and methods follow in Chapter 9, 
results in Chapter 10, and lastly a discussion and conclusions in Chapters 11 and 12. 
Pharmaceutical expenditures, the reference price system and competition in the pharmaceutical market 16 
 
 
 
2 The pharmaceutical sector 
2.1 The pharmaceutical industry and pharmaceutical product timeline 
Between 2011 and 2015, the average growth rate of the global pharmaceuticals mar­
kets was 6.2% (IMS Health 2015). North America dominates the market with about 
49% of the market in 2016, followed by Europe, which accounts for about 22% of the 
market. In the European Union (EU), five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom) account for 68% of the total EU market. (EFPIA 2017.) 
In the international perspective, the Finnish pharmaceutical market is rather small, 
accounting for approximately 1% of the European market (EFPIA 2017). In 2016, 
the total pharmaceutical sales in Finland were 3,067 million euros, which was 3.7% 
more than in the previous year. Prescription medicines in outpatient care accounted 
for 2,137 million euros and over the counter medicines for 352 million euros in retail 
prices (incl. value added tax, VAT). The rest, 578 million euros in wholesale prices, 
resulted from sales to hospitals. (Fimea and Kela 2017b.) 
According to estimates from the late 2000s, the global pharmaceutical industry is 
highly fragmented and it consists of thousands of companies of various sizes. Several 
hundreds of them are research-based companies that have brought at least one new 
pharmaceutical to the market. (Kyle 2007; OECD 2008.) However, a handful of large 
international companies control a significant share of the market. (WHO 2005.) 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most research-intensive industries in the 
world. According to the OECD, the industry spent about 10–15% of its revenues on 
research and development in 2011.1 (OECD 2015.) In Finland, pharmaceutical re­
search and development activity is limited and the number of ongoing clinical trials 
conducted in Finland has fallen in the 21st century (Fimea and Kela 2017a). 
In order to encourage innovation, governments grant intellectual property rights, 
or patents, to inventors of new products. Patents exclude others from making and 
selling the invention for the term of the patent. This creates a monopoly position, 
which allows the pharmaceutical company to recoup its investment, make a reason­
able profit and reinvest in research and development. (European Commission 2018.) 
The development of a new pharmaceutical product is highly research intensive and 
time-consuming. The timeline for a new pharmaceutical product divides into three 
phases: 1) the pre-launch phase where research and development take place, and 
which ends at the product gaining marketing authorization; 2) the marketing and 
sales phase during which the product is protected by exclusivity rights; 3) the phase 
According to the World Health Organization’s estimate from 2005, pharmaceutical companies spend one third of all 
sales revenue on marketing their products. This is roughly twice as much as on research and development. (WHO 
2005.) 
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after exclusivity rights have been lost and generic competition begins. (Figure 1.) 
The time preceding marketing authorization varies typically between two and ten 
years, the average being about five years. As companies generally apply for a patent 
at the beginning of the research and development phase, the effective patent period 
after the product has received approval is typically much shorter than the term of the 
patent. The term of the patent is generally 20 years, but supplementary protection 
certificates, which extend the period of protected exclusivity rights, are often applied. 
(European Commission 2013.) 
Figure 1. Pharmaceutical product timeline. 
Patent protection Generic competition 
Pre-launch phase 
– research and 
development 
Phase of 
protected 
exclusivity rights 
Exclusivity 
rights lost 
Like all health care services, pharmaceuticals are typically regarded as merit goods. 
This encompasses the societal belief that health needs – not individual preferences 
or the ability to pay – should determine the use of pharmaceuticals. (Fiorito and 
Kollintzas 2004; WHO 2012.) While European law (EU Directive 2001/83/EC) regu­
lates the marketing authorization of a pharmaceutical product in Europe, national 
laws regulate pricing and reimbursement systems. In order to promote affordable ac­
cess to pharmaceuticals, most European countries subsidize the cost of medicine in 
part or in full for some or all of their population. The scope of the coverage schemes 
varies between countries. (OECD 2008.) In addition, most European countries have 
adopted some form of price regulation for reimbursed pharmaceuticals. The aim in 
regulating prices is both to secure patient access to effective and safe pharmaceuticals 
and to control expenditures. The used pricing systems often vary between on-patent 
and off-patent products. (Dukes et al. 2003; Mrazek and Mossialos 2004.) 
2.2 The off-patent pharmaceutical market 
There are predominantly two types of pharmaceuticals: originator products and ge­
neric products. An originator product is the first version of a medicine, developed 
and patented by an originator pharmaceutical company (WHO Collaborating Cen­
tre for Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 2016). A generic product is chemically 
equivalent and bioequivalent to the originator product but it can only enter the mar­
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ket after the patent or other exclusive rights of the originator product have expired. 
While the originator product must go through an expensive and lengthy research and 
development process in order to gain marketing authorization, a generic product can 
enter the market once it has a proven chemical equivalence and bioequivalence to 
the originator product. This comparatively fast and inexpensive development process 
allows selling generic products for an often substantially cheaper price. (Baumgärtel 
2012; European Medicines Agency 2012.)2 
Typically, there is a time gap between the loss of exclusivity rights and generic entry. 
In EU countries, the average time to generic entry was 12.9 months for expiries be­
tween 2000 and 2006. For high value products, the time gap was shorter, 7.9 months 
on average. (Glowicka et al. 2009.) 
Generic medicines can play a significant role in securing patient access to afford­
able pharmaceuticals and reducing pharmaceutical costs. In 2014, the average market 
share of generic medicines in EU countries was 52% in volume and 24% in value, 
though there were large differences between countries. In volume, the shares ranged 
from 9% to 84% and in value from 5% to 41%. In Finland, generics accounted for 
40% in volume and 17% in value of the total pharmaceutical market in 2014. This 
was below the EU average in terms of both volume and value. (OECD 2016b.) The 
same variation between countries exists in prices. Even 16-fold differences between 
the highest and the lowest prices of some individual generic products have been ob­
served among EU member states (Kanavos et al. 2011). While the pharmaceutical 
market and the determinants of pharmaceutical prices are complex, the differences 
are largely attributable to different regulatory systems and taken cost containment 
measures (Kanavos et al. 2011; Panteli et al. 2016). 
The cost of bringing a new pharmaceutical into the market is highly debated. One estimation has been given by the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), which estimated the development of 
a new prescription pharmaceutical that gains market approval to cost the pharmaceutical company up to €1,172 million
(EFPIA 2015). 
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3 Rising expenditures and cost containment in the pharmaceutical sector 
3.1 Rising pharmaceutical expenditures 
In the early 2000s, pharmaceutical expenditures were growing at a rapid pace in 
most OECD countries. In addition, the average real annual growth in pharmaceuti­
cal spending was faster than the average annual health spending. Between 1990 and 
2004, the average real annual growth in pharmaceutical spending was more than 5%, 
compared with health spending where the growth was 4% on average. However, since 
the mid-2000s pharmaceutical spending has been increasing at a slower pace. On 
average, the growth has also been slower than the growth in overall health spending. 
Between 2005 and 2013, the annual average growth in pharmaceutical spending was 
0.7% in real terms compared with 2.4% for overall health spending. (Belloni et al. 
2016; OECD 2017.) 
In Finland, outpatient pharmaceutical costs and reimbursement costs grew rapidly 
until the turn of the 21st century but this trend slowed down by the end of the 2000s 
(Figure 2). In 2016, the total cost for reimbursed prescription pharmaceuticals in out­
patient care was 2,137 million euros3 of which paid reimbursements made up 1,412 
million euros. Compared to the year 2015, outpatient pharmaceutical costs and reim­
bursement costs had grown by 3.6% and 2.5%, respectively. (Fimea and Kela 2016.) 
Figure 2. Reimbursed pharmaceutical costsa in outpatient care in Finland 1994–2016, divided into reim­
bursement costs and out-of-pocket expenses. 
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An initial deductible of €50 per calendar year was introduced in 2016 (Kela 2017c). The total expenditures presented 
in this study include purchases under the initial deductible. 
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The growth in pharmaceutical spending is attributed to two main reasons: increased 
pharmaceutical use and the introduction of new, higher-priced products. The in­
creased pharmaceutical use reflects both changes in the number of patients and the 
amounts consumed by patients. New medicines have been introduced for conditions 
where pharmacotherapies did not exist earlier, and the number of concomitant treat­
ments received per patient has increased (Morgan 2005; Serra-Sastre and McGuire 
2009; Sorenson et al. 2013; Karampli et al. 2014). Also, the aging of the population is 
a contributing factor as the elderly are by and large the largest consumers of health care 
services, including prescription pharmaceuticals (Kildemoes et al. 2006; de Meijer et 
al. 2013; OECD 2016a). Diagnostic procedures have evolved and in many conditions 
pharmacotherapies are initiated in earlier stages, possibly with increased dosages and 
longer treatments. Treatment practices of, for instance, mental disorders and some 
types of cancer may also have changed by allowing outpatient care in conditions that 
used to be treated in inpatient care. (Chernew et al. 2001; de Joncheere et al. 2002; 
Morgan 2005.) While this shifts costs from inpatient care to outpatient care, it can 
also raise overall costs through pharmacy margins. 
A second reason for the high rates of increase in pharmaceutical spending has been 
the increased use of higher-priced products. New high-priced products penetrate the 
market replacing older, less-expensive ones. (Gerdtham and Lundin 2004; Morgan 
2005; Shireman et al. 2005; LaFleur et al. 2008.) The landscape of new pharmaceuti­
cal products entering the market is changing. The focus has shifted from products for 
common diseases towards rare diseases and specialty medicines. While some of these 
medicines produce health benefits, they are also very expensive. 
3.2 Supply and demand side measures in cost containment 
Rising pharmaceutical expenditures have lead governments to balance with contain­
ing public expenditures while still ensuring patient access to affordable medicines. 
Cost containment measures divide roughly into measures aimed at the supply side 
and measures aimed at the demand side (Table 1, p. 21). Supply side measures can 
target the manufacturer level, the wholesale level, and the pharmacy level. The meas­
ures, such as reimbursement lists (positive and negative lists), profit control, a cost­
plus system4, substitution by pharmacies, and reference price schemes, aim primarily 
to regulate the prices of pharmaceuticals either directly or indirectly. (Rietveld and 
Haaijer-Ruskamp 2002; Ess et al. 2003; Mrazek and Mossialos 2004; Aaserud et al. 
2006.) International price comparisons may also have a significant role in the process 
of setting prices. However, international price comparisons typically become less im­
portant when a product enters the off-patent market sector and generic competition 
begins. (Ruggeri and Nolte 2013.) In addition, even in the on-patent market sector 
managed entry arrangements between manufacturers and payers or providers are in­
Cost-plus pricing is a system where the retail prices of medicines are set by taking into account production costs 
together with allowances for promotional expenses, manufacturers’ profit margins, and charges and profit margins in 
the supply chain (WHO 2015). 
4
 21 
 
 
Pharmaceutical expenditures, the reference price system and competition in the pharmaceutical market
creasingly common. They include both financial and performance based agreements, 
of which financial based agreements are more common. These agreements include 
various kinds of non-disclosed discounts to list prices, which makes international 
price comparisons increasingly difficult. (WHO Collaborating Centre for Pharma­
ceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies 2016; Pauwels et al. 2017.) 
Demand side measures can be aimed at one or several levels of demand; the patient, 
the physician or the pharmacy. Demand is primarily influenced with financial or 
educational measures. While patient co-payments are the most common demand 
side measure, also caps (a maximum number of prescriptions or drugs that are reim­
bursed), educational and professional interventions and incentives have been used. 
Educational interventions can be aimed at the general public, patients or physicians. 
(Ess et al. 2003; Mrazek and Mossialos 2004; Austvoll-Dahlgren et al. 2008.) How­
ever, many of the measures can have an effect on both the demand and supply sides. 
For example, a German study found that pharmaceutical companies decreased their 
prices as the patients’ co-payment increased (Pavcnik 2002). 
Table 1. Measures to contain pharmaceutical expenditures.a 
Supply-side measures Demand-side measures 
Pricing Cost-sharing 
Price controls Caps 
Generic substitution Co-payments 
Reference-based pricing Moving products to over-the-counter status 
International price comparisons Rational prescribing and use 
Pharmacoeconomic evaluations Educational interventions 
Cost-plus pricing Clinical practice guidelines 
Managed entry arrangements Feedback to physicians 
Authorization   Advertising restrictions 
Reimbursement lists Budgets 
Price freezes and/or cuts National, regional or physician level 
Profit ceilings 
a See e.g. Rietveld and Haaijer-Ruskamp (2002). 
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3.3 Generic substitution and the reference price system 
In generic substitution, pharmacies have either the right or the obligation to substi­
tute a prescribed product with a chemically equivalent but less expensive one. Ref­
erence-based pricing5 is a reimbursement mechanism in which a payer sets a ceiling 
price for pharmaceuticals that belong to the same cluster. The ceiling price, such as 
the reference price, is the maximum price for which a reimbursement is paid for 
all products in the same group. The ceiling price is typically based on the lowest or 
the average price of drugs in that group. Manufacturers are free to set their prices, but 
if the price exceeds the reference price, the patient pays the difference in full. (Dan­
zon 2001; Puig-Junoy 2005; Galizzi et al. 2011.) 
Generic clustering is the narrowest form of clustering. In generic clustering pharma­
ceuticals are clustered according to the active substance. This is typically referred to 
as generic reference pricing. In therapeutic reference pricing, pharmaceuticals with 
chemically-related, pharmacologically equivalent active substances or a similar ther­
apeutic effect are grouped together. (Dylst et al. 2011.) 
The reasoning behind reference pricing is to stimulate competition between man­
ufacturers and rational decision-making by patients (Danzon and Ketcham 2004; 
Brekke et al. 2007). Therefore, while the reference price system as a cost containment 
measure is aimed especially at the supply side, it also has an impact on the demand 
side through patient co-payments. As competition in the pharmaceutical market is 
typically weak, reference pricing is an attempt to mimic competitive markets and set 
prices to a competitive level (Danzon and Chao 2000). On the other hand, a German 
study found that pharmaceutical companies try to compensate reduced revenues in 
the reference price sector by increasing the price level of their non-reference-priced 
products. These products are typically first-of-its-kind type of products. (Augurzky 
et al. 2009.) 
The term reference pricing can refer either to external or internal reference pricing. In external reference pricing, the 
price of a pharmaceutical product in other countries are used to set or negotiate the price of the product in a given 
country. (Remuzat et al. 2015.) In this thesis, the term refers to internal reference pricing. 
5
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4 Reimbursement, pricing and the reference price system in Finland 
4.1 The reimbursement and pricing of pharmaceutical products in Finland 
In Finland, prescription drugs used in outpatient care are reimbursed under the Na­
tional Health Insurance scheme, which covers all permanent residents in Finland. The 
patient is reimbursed – typically directly at the pharmacy – according to a pharmacy 
retail price, which consists of the wholesale price, a statutory pharmacy mark-up, 
value added tax, and the pharmacists’ remuneration. No statutory wholesale mark­
ups are in place. The pharmacy mark-up, or the retail price, is calculated according to 
a formula set by the Finnish Government. (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in 
collaboration with the WHO 2011.) 
In order for an on-patent pharmaceutical product to be included in the reimburse­
ment system, it is required that the Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board, subordinate to 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, has confirmed the reimbursement status 
and the reasonable wholesale price. The Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board makes the 
decisions on the reasonable wholesale price and the reimbursement status simultane­
ously and they are valid for a fixed term only. (Fimea and Kela 2016.) In evaluating 
the applied wholesale price, the Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board takes into account, 
for instance, the treatment cost incurred and the benefits gained from the use of the 
pharmaceutical, the prices of comparable pharmaceuticals in Finland, the prices of 
the pharmaceuticals in other European Economic Area countries, the costs of manu­
facturing, the research and development of the pharmaceuticals and the funds avail­
able for reimbursement. The applicant must also present a health economic evalua­
tion. (Act 1224/2004.) 
When a product is included in the reference price system, the Pharmaceuticals Pric­
ing Board confirms a maximum wholesale price for the product. For generic prod­
ucts, the maximum wholesale price for the first product must be 50%6 lower than the 
original product’s price, and the subsequent generic products cannot be priced high­
er than other generics. The maximum wholesale price of the originator product is the 
same as before the loss of exclusivity rights. (Pelkonen 2011; Pharmaceuticals Pric­
ing Board 2015.) However, from 2016 onwards, the Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board 
applies a reduction to the maximum wholesale prices of originator products in the 
beginning of the fourth reference price period after the establishment of the reference 
price group. This pertains to cases where the maximum wholesale price of an origina­
tor product is higher than the highest confirmed wholesale price for generic products 
included in the reference price group. In these cases, a new maximum wholesale price 
is confirmed, which corresponds to the highest maximum wholesale price of a ge­
neric product included in the reference price group. (Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board 
2016.) The maximum wholesale price is the maximum price for which wholesalers 
can sell the product to pharmacies in order for the product to be included in the re-
Until January 2016, the percentage was 40. 6
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imbursement system. However, after a product is included in the reference price sys­
tem, the reimbursement is only paid up to the reference price. (Fimea and Kela 2016.) 
4.2 Generic substitution and the reference price system in Finland 
Finland adopted mandatory generic substitution in April 2003. Since then pharma­
cies have been obligated to substitute a prescribed medicine with the cheapest or close 
to the cheapest interchangeable alternative. Substitutable products must contain the 
same active substance, the same quantity, have the same route of administration, and 
the package sizes must be comparable. The products must also be bioequivalent and 
belong to a pharmaceutical group in which substitution is safe. Substitutable prod­
ucts are included in a list of interchangeable medicines. Fimea compiles the list. (Kela 
2017a.) 
When only generic substitution was in use, both the physician and the patient 
could veto the substitution without affecting the reimbursement rate of the product. 
Stronger monetary incentives were introduced when Finland adopted a generic ref­
erence price system in April 2009. Medicines priced at or below the reference price 
are subsidized according to their purchase price. Medicines above the reference price 
are subsidized only up to the reference price, and the patient is required to pay the 
excess in total. If the prescribing doctor vetoes the substitution, the purchase price 
of the dispensed product is the base for the reimbursement. (Fimea and Kela 2016.) 
When generic substitution was introduced, the maximum price difference to the least 
expensive medicine in the substitution group was €2 when the least expensive prod­
uct was priced under €40 and €3 when the least expensive product was priced €40 or 
more. As the reference price system was implemented, the price difference to the least 
expensive product was narrowed down to €1.50 for products priced under €40 and 
€2.00 for products priced €40 or more. The price difference was cut down to a sin­
gle value of €0.50 at the beginning of 2017 (Act 1101/2016). These price differences 
determine both the reference prices for products belonging to the reference price 
system and price band ceilings for products that belong only to generic substitution. 
While reference prices and price bands are determined quarterly, companies give 
price notifications every two weeks. This means that companies can adjust their pric­
es as early as two weeks after the introduction of new reference prices. (Kela 2017a.) 
While Fimea decides which medicines are to be included in generic substitution, 
the Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board specifies the medicines that are covered by the 
reference price system. The list of products covered by the reference price system 
is based on Fimea’s list of substitutable products. (Kela 2017a.) When the reference 
price system was introduced, reference price groups were formed if the reference 
price group contained at least one reimbursable generic product available on the 
market. This was amended in 2017 so that a reference price group is also formed if the 
substitution group contains at least one reimbursable parallel-imported or parallel­
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distributed product available on the market. These products remain, however, in the 
sphere of price confirmation until the first generic product enters the reference price 
group. (Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board 2017.) 
Concurrent with the adoption of the reference price system, the range of medici­
nal products available for generic substitution was also extended. In Finland, it was 
not possible to grant product patents for medicinal substances before 1995; only so­
called analogy process patents were possible. Though products protected by an anal­
ogy process patent were initially included in generic substitution, this decision was 
amended in 2006 when pharmaceuticals protected by an analogy process patent in 
Finland were excluded from generic substitution. However, when the Finnish gov­
ernment approved the reference price system, it decided that pharmaceuticals pro­
tected by an analogy process patent would again be included in the sphere of generic 
substitution (Act 803/2008). This meant that products protected by an analogy pro­
cess patent could be included in generic substitution and the reference price system 
in Finland even while the products were still under patent protection in many other 
countries (Saastamoinen et al. 2010; OECD 2014). 
In Finland, pharmacies are obliged to provide information and guidance to patients 
on medicine prices. (Act 395/1987.) In January 2016, the obligation to provide infor­
mation on medicine prices was amended so that pharmacies now have the obligation 
to inform the patient of the actual cheapest product within a reference group (Gov­
ernment proposal 330/2014). 
Details of generic substitution and the reference price system applied in Finland and 
main amendments to the systems are presented in Table 2 (p. 26). 
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In 2016, reimbursed pharmaceuticals belonging to the reference price system ac­
counted for 575 million euros, showing a growth in share from 17.5% in 2009 to 
28.3% in 2016 (Figure 3). In the same year, reimbursements for medicine costs were 
paid to 3.8 million persons of whom 91.7% were reimbursed for at least one product 
in the reference price system. This share has remained rather stable and it was 88.9% 
in 2010. At the end of 2016, more than half (56%) of the products in the reimburse­
ment system were included in the reference price system. (Kela 2017b.) 
Figure 3. Expenditures of reimbursed pharmaceuticalsa belonging to the reference price system (RPS), 
belonging only to generic substitution (GS) or belonging to neither in 2009–2016. 
€ million 
2,500 
2,000 
1,500 In RPS 
Only in GS 
1,000 Not in GS or RPS 
500 
0 
a Deflated to 2016 money with the cost of living index. 
Source: Kela 2017b. 
A Finnish study analysed the impact of implementing the reference price system on 
the prices of all reimbursed pharmaceutical products. The products were grouped 
according to whether they were included in the reference price system, included in 
generic substitution only or not included in either of the systems. Before the imple­
mentation of the reference price system, the average daily cost of all included prod­
ucts was €0.63. There was a slight monthly downwards trend preceding the reference 
price system (−0.4 cents per month) followed by a drop of 4 cents in the level of the 
average daily cost after the implementation of the system. No statistically significant 
change was observed in the post-reference price system trend. 39 months after the 
implementation of the reference price system, the average daily cost of products in­
cluded in the system was 12.4% lower than it would have been were the reference 
price system not implemented. However, the implementation of the reference price 
system also had an impact on the average daily cost of products included only in ge­
neric substitution and products not included in either system (Figure 4, p. 28). The 
impact was the opposite in the two groups. 39 months after the implementation of 
the reference price system, the average daily cost for products included only in ge­
neric substitution was 9.6% lower and for products not included in either system, the 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
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average daily price was 6.3% higher than it would have been were the reference price 
system not implemented. However, the rising trend in products included in neither 
system was visible even before the introduction of reference pricing, and the trend 
escalated only slightly. (Koskinen et al. 2013.) 
Figure 4. The average daily cost of products included in the reference price system (RPS), included only in 
generic substitution (GS) or included in neither system from January 2006 to June 2012. 
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5 Competition and the pharmaceutical market
In economic theory, perfect competition represents an ideal market structure where 
competition is at its greatest possible level. Imperfect competition exists when one or 
more of the conditions for perfect competition are absent. (Begg et al. 2000a.) This 
chapter reviews the conditions for perfect competition and their presence in the phar­
maceutical markets from the buyer’s perspective. The conditions are: 1) a large num­
ber of buyers and sellers who are all price-takers, 2) homogeneous products, 3) perfect
information and 4) free entry and exit to the market. The focus is on competition in
the off-patent pharmaceutical market, that is, in situations where the originator prod­
uct has lost its exclusivity rights and generic products are able to enter the market. 
More specifically, the focus is on off-patent markets under a reference price system. 
A perfectly competitive market requires a set of characteristics to be fulfilled. Firstly,
there should be a large number of buyers and sellers, who are all individually too small 
to set prices and are thus price-takers. Supply and demand determine prices. The price 
determines the buyer’s willingness to consume. (Begg et al. 2000b.) 
The pharmaceutical industry is a highly research-intensive sector and therefore capi­
tal requirements and economies of scale7 are evident. While capital requirements are 
less considerable in the off-patent market sector, scale advantages persist. Therefore, 
large companies are better positioned than small companies to gain and retain mar­
ket dominance and to influence prices. In addition, incumbency advantages inde­
pendent of size8, such as experience from the market and the regulatory system, can 
give advantage to established companies (Porter 1979). In the last quarter of 2017, 
there were 972 reference groups included in the Finnish reference price system. Alto­
gether 60 companies gave price notifications for products included in these groups. 
The companies were of various sizes and some of them have a large selection of prod­
ucts on the market while some have only one or very few. The markets are, however, 
highly concentrated and according to the OECD, Finland’s biggest pharmaceutical 
company holds a market share of 50%. (OECD 2014.) 
Due to insurance, patients typically do not bear the full cost of their pharmaceuti­
cal consumption. In situations where patients have low co-payments, there is a risk 
of overusing pharmaceuticals and low price-consciousness (Scott Morton and Kyle 
2012). In addition, physicians seem to be less price-conscious in situations where 
patients’ do not need to bear the full cost of the prescribed pharmaceuticals (Nyman 
1999; Danzon and Pauly 2002). A reference price system aims to tackle this issue 
by placing additional co-payments upon patients if they are unwilling to substitute 
7	 Economies of scale refers to the competitive advantage large companies have over smaller companies (Silberston 1972). 
8	 Cost advantage independent of size refers to the advantage entrenched companies may have over newcomers, inde­
pendent of company size. This advantage can result from e.g. the experience curve, access to materials or a favourable 
location. (Porter 1979.) 
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products priced over the reference price with cheaper ones. Therefore, patients are 
assumed to decrease the consumption of products priced above the reference price 
and shift the demand to products priced at or below the reference price. (Moreno-
Torres 2011.) 
In a reference price system, regulators set reference prices for medicines subject to 
the system. Typically, there is no incentive for patients, physicians or pharmacies to 
be price-sensitive with prices below the reference price as it has little or no impact 
on the patient’s share of costs and can have a negative impact on pharmacies’ profit 
margin. Therefore, there is little incentive for companies to compete by setting prices 
below the reference price. In fact, there is some evidence that companies increase 
the prices of products initially priced below the reference price to match the refer­
ence prices. (Danzon and Ketcham 2004; Puig-Junoy 2007.) In Finland, a maximum 
wholesale price is set for products that are included in the reference price system. 
In the fourth quarter price notification in 2017, approximately 32% of the products 
subject to reference pricing were priced to the level of the maximum wholesale price. 
The demand for pharmaceuticals is relatively inelastic. Across several studies, price 
elasticity has been observed to range from −0.2 to −0.6 indicating that an increase 
of 10% in cost sharing would be associated with a 2 to 6% decline in prescription 
drug use or expenditures. Less price sensitivity is observed in pharmaceuticals used 
for chronic conditions than in pharmaceuticals used for acute conditions. (Manning 
et al. 1987; Contoyannis et al. 2005; Simonsen et al. 2016.) On the other hand, stud­
ies examining the association between reference pricing and pharmaceutical use 
and spending found large increases in the use of pharmaceuticals priced at or below 
the reference price and sharp declines in the use of higher-priced pharmaceuticals 
that require patient cost sharing. (Goldman et al. 2007.) During the first year of the 
reference price system in Finland, patients rejected substitution in 33% of the cases 
when the prescribed product’s price was above the reference price. Physicians reject 
substitution only very rarely, in less than one percent of the purchases. (Saastamoinen 
et al. 2010.) In 2014, substitution was rejected in 6% of all purchases of products sub­
ject to reference pricing (Martikainen et al. 2016). 
Secondly, perfect competition assumes that the products in the market are homogeneous 
and, therefore, perfect substitutes for each other. Buyers show no preference for a prod­
uct from a particular seller. (Begg et al. 2000b.) Originator companies have, as first 
movers, a product differentiation9 advantage that enables them to hold substantial 
Product differentiation leads to buyers perceiving products as unique. A distinction should be made between ho­
rizontally and vertically differentiated products. Horizontal differentiation occurs when the decision to purchase is 
made according to subjective preferences such as colours and shapes. Vertical differentiation occurs when there are 
measurable and qualitative differences. Most products contain both types of differentiation but the generic market 
sector resembles horizontal differentiation more closely. (Hotelling 1929; Shaked and Sutton 1982; Shaked and Sutton 
1987; Caplin and Nalebuff 1991.) Product differentiation is applied increasingly in pharmaceutical markets. Strategies 
include new dosage forms, fixed drug combinations and new indications (Dubey and Dubey 2009). 
9
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market shares even after lower-priced generic products enter the market (Schmalen­
see 1982; Conrad 1983). First-mover differentiation advantage appears to hold also 
in the first generic entrant: a Canadian study observed an increase of about 30% in 
market share compared to other generics for at least four years (Hollis 2002). 
In addition, patients can have brand preferences. In Spain, 13% of the population 
would not accept generics as substitutes for originator products (Costa Font et al. 
2014). Even when generics are viewed positively, it does not necessarily result in ge­
neric uptake (Hassali et al. 2009). In Finland, generic uptake increased significantly 
after the implementation of the reference price system. However, some patients still 
chose to purchase originator products priced over the reference price. While female 
gender, higher age and higher income increased the probability of originator prod­
uct choice in some active substances, the right to special reimbursement lowered it. 
(Haula et al. 2014.) This is understandable in light of the fact that rejecting substitu­
tion in a special reimbursement category purchase often has an even more significant 
impact on patients’ out-of-pocket expenses in relative terms than forbidding substi­
tution in a basic reimbursement category purchase. 
Thirdly, perfect competition assumes that buyers are perfectly informed about the qual­
ity, utility and price of the product and of the substitute products. They also act ration­
ally. There is no extra cost for the buyer to switch between products or to acquire 
information about products and their prices. (Begg et al. 2000b.) 
Pharmaceuticals can be regarded as credence goods10, where substantial information 
asymmetry exists between patients, physicians and manufacturers. In pharmaceuti­
cal markets, this information asymmetry is handled by assigning the assessment of 
the quality, and pricing when applicable, of a product to regulators. (Scott Morton 
and Kyle 2012.) 
Even within the demand side, asymmetry exists as typically the prescribing physi­
cian and the dispensing pharmacist have more knowledge than the patient11. Fur­
thermore, as the number of pharmaceuticals is vast and continuously changing, 
a prescribing physician, let alone a patient, can rarely keep up with the alternatives, 
their therapeutic values, and prices. Consequently, decisions on prescriptions are of­
ten made under imperfect information. (WHO 1997.) In a reference price system, 
10  Credence goods refers to situations where an expert knows more than the customer about the need and quality of goods
and services a customer requires. There is great information asymmetry between the buyer and seller. Possible problems
arising from this information asymmetry include, for instance, undertreatment and overtreatment, overcharging and 
excessive pricing. (Darby and Karni 1973; Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006.) 
11	 The relationship between a patient and a physician is referred to as an agency relationship where the assumedly
better-informed agent, the physician, acts on behalf of the assumedly less informed principle, the patient (Buchanan 
1988). Presuming that the physician, acting as an agent, aims to maximize the patient’s utility, his prescription choice 
should be the least costly one among equally effective choices, though taking into account patient preferences. It has 
been reported that while physicians do show sensitivity to patient costs and cost-sensitivity, it happens only when the 
cost differences between the choices is significantly high (Carrera et al. 2018). 
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regulators have clustered together products with a similar therapeutic effect and set 
a maximum reimbursement, or a reference price, to these products. There is no ex­
tra cost for a patient to switch between these products. In addition, pharmacies are 
obliged to provide guidance and information to patients in regard to the products 
and their prices. 
Lastly, the perfect competition theory assumes is that there is free entry and exit to the 
market. There would be no patents or other exclusive rights. In addition, the govern­
ment or other authorities would not restrain competition with, for instance, tariffs, 
subsidies or trade restrictions. (Begg et al. 2000b.) 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most regulated industries. Regulation ap­
plies to research and development, to marketing authorization and, in most countries 
at least in some form, to reimbursement and pricing. Patents are an essential part of 
the industry. Market entry for generic products is typically easier than for originator 
products. This is, among other things, because the research and development process 
for a generic product is much quicker and less expensive than for an originator prod­
uct and because explicit pricing regulations for generic products are often in place. 
Also in Finland, the process of gaining reimbursement status and a confirmed price 
is typically a quicker process for generic products than for originator products (Phar­
maceuticals Pricing Board 2015). 
Barriers to entry include access to distribution channels (Porter 1980). In practice, 
there are two wholesalers for pharmaceuticals in Finland. One-channel distribution 
is the prevailing practice though any law or regulation does not impose it. There is 
no fixed wholesale mark-up, so each company must negotiate it by themselves. The 
mark-up is not public knowledge but it is estimated to range between 1 and 20%, 
large companies having an advantage over small ones. (Valliluoto 2012.) Pharmacies 
are responsible for the retail sales of pharmaceuticals in Finland. At the end of 2016, 
there were 810 pharmacy outlets in Finland (The Association of Finnish Pharma­
cies 2017). Pharmacies are required to keep a sufficient stock of medicines, including 
products at or under reference price, in hand. They are also obliged to provide pa­
tients with information on medicine prices and, on request, to order products from 
a wholesaler. 
Perfect competition is a hypothetical market structure that is seldom, if ever, 
achieved. In real life, particularly in the pharmaceutical markets, competition is al­
ways somewhat imperfect. However, perfect competition can be used as a benchmark 
to compare between pharmaceutical market structures. (Begg et al. 2000a.) In Table 3 
(p. 33), perfect competition conditions and the conditions in the generic market sec­
tor under a reference price system are reviewed. 
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Table 3. Conditions for perfect competition and the conditions of generic pharmaceutical markets subject
to reference pricing. 
Perfect competition condition 
Conditions of generic pharmaceutical markets subject to 
reference pricing 
1. Large number of buyers and sellers 
• All with a relatively small market share 
• All price-takers 
• Price determines willingness to consume 
Potentially a large number of sellers 
Large companies often have an advantage over smaller ones
→ Typically concentrated markets 
No incentive for price-sensitivity at prices below reference prices 
Prices have a tendency to increase towards maximum prices 
Inelastic demand, though less in a reference price system 
2. Products are homogeneous 
• No preferences 
Regulators define which products are homogeneousa 
Product differentiation and first mover advantage exist 
→ Some patients exhibit brand loyalty and preferences 
→ Also prescribing physicians and dispensing pharmacies can 
exhibit brand loyalty and preferences 
3. Buyers are perfectly informed 
• No extra cost to switch between products
or to acquire information 
Substantial information asymmetry exists between patients, 
physicians, pharmacists and manufacturers 
→ Patients are not perfectly informed about the qualities of
a product, the associated utilities and prices
Pharmacies are obliged to offer information about prices 
→ There is no extra cost to switch between products 
4. Free entry and exit to the market 
• Equal entry to distribution channels 
Highly regulated markets 
→ Concessions to generic medicines 
Large, established companies can have an advantage in regard to 
entry to distribution channels 
a While generic products must have the same active substance, strength, dosage form, and route of administration as the origi­
nator products, they do not need to contain the same inactive substances. They may also differ in color and shape. However, 
the bioequivalence, i.e. the performance, of the generic product compared to the originator product must be proven. (Kesselheim 
et al. 2008.) 
In circumstances with no free entry to the market, the power to set up prices concen­
trates in the hands of few companies. Indeed, even after generic competition has be­
gun, monopolistic markets often persist or oligopolistic markets appear. (Puig-Junoy 
2005.) In an oligopoly, there are only few sellers competing in the market. While 
there is no exact threshold for the number of competitors in oligopolistic markets, 
a rule of thumb is that an oligopoly exists when four or less companies account for 
more than 60% of the total market sales (Selten 1973; Shepherd 1997). 
Aside from perfect competition, other theories propose that the same efficiency can 
be reached with other market structures. For example, according to the theory of 
contestable markets, perfect competition prices and output can be reached with just 
a few of the perfect competition assumptions. In contestable markets, the short-term 
threat from potential competitors provides such pressure over the present market 
holders that a competitive price is reached even with a relatively small number of sell­
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ers. (Baumol 1982.)12 Furthermore, according to Bertrand’s duopoly model, oligopo­
listic markets can reach the same prices as perfect competition markets as long as the 
sellers in oligopolistic markets compete by changing their prices, not the quantities 
offered (Singh and Vives 1984). 
12	 To prove the threat of new entrants, this theory places special attention on free entry to and exit from the market. While 
inside the market, the new entrant should have the same advantages as the present market holder/-s. Also, the reaction 
time to changes for the present market holders should be longer than the time for a new firm to enter the market. In 
addition, consumers respond instantly to price differences. (Baumol 1982; Dixit 1982.) 
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 6 Previous literature on the impact of a reference price system on pharmaceutical 
prices 
A literature search was performed to identify previous literature on the impact of 
a reference price system on prices and expenditures of pharmaceuticals subject to the 
system. A substantial body of literature, including previous literature reviews, was 
identified. Of the earlier literature reviews, one of the most recent was by Acosta et 
al. (2014). A systemized literature search to update their literature review was per­
formed. The used databases included Medline, EMBASE, EconLit, The Cochrane Li­
brary, PAIS Index and Sociological Abstracts (between 1 January 2011 and 10 Febru­
ary 2017). The used search terms were: reference pricing, reference price system/-s, 
prices and costs. Studies were eligible for inclusion in the supplementary review if 
the impact of internal reference pricing on prices or expenditures was studied using 
empirical data. The supplementary literature search strategy is presented in the Ap­
pendix. 
Acosta et al. (2014) identified 13 studies analyzing the impact of a reference price sys­
tem on pharmaceutical prices or expenditures. The supplementary search identified 
six relevant new studies, two of which were our own studies (Koskinen et al. 2014; 
Koskinen et al. 2015) and therefore not included in this summary. Of the remaining 
four studies, two reported results from the same study. The main results of the stud­
ies Acosta et al. (2014) refer to and the studies found in the supplementary search are 
presented in Table 4 (p. 37). 
According to the literature, the implementation of a reference price system reduces 
the prices of drugs subject to the system. This result seems to be rather universal 
across different reference price systems and countries. The only deviations from this 
result come from two studies, one from Canada (Grootendorst et al. 2002) and the 
other from the US (Kibicho and Pinkerton 2012), countries with quite different pric­
ing and regulatory systems compared to the European systems. In the other included 
studies, the price decrease was even close to 50% (Grootendorst et al. 2002; Marshall 
et al. 2002; Grootendorst et al. 2005; Kaiser et al. 2014), most of the impact seen 
soon after the implementation of a reference price system (Grootendorst et al. 2002). 
There were large differences between pharmaceutical groups. Results from Denmark 
suggest that a reference price system is likely to reduce only the prices of long-term 
treatment drugs (Kaiser and Mendez 2015). While this assumption was not tested in 
the other studies, several studies found that price decreases were greater for origina­
tor products than for generic products (Aronsson et al. 2001; Pavenik 2002; Brekke 
et al. 2011). This trend is comprehensible in light of the fact that generic products 
have typically lower prices than originator products. Therefore, originator products 
face a greater threat of losing market shares when a reference price system is imple­
mented. However, the results from Denmark were the opposite; the prices of generic 
products decreased more than the prices of originator products (Kaiser et al. 2014; 
Kaiser and Mendez 2015). 
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The implementation of a reference price system also reduces pharmaceutical expen­
ditures and the amount third party payers spend on medicines overall (Sawyer 1983; 
Schneeweiss et al. 2002b; Schneeweiss et al. 2003; Grootendorst et al. 2005; Puig-
Junoy 2007; Moreno-Torres et al. 2011). These results apply to the short term, longer 
terms effects are uncertain. However, relative to the total pharmaceutical expendi­
tures, the savings achieved with a reference price system can remain moderate. For 
example, in Spain the implementation of a reference price system led to a saving of 
1.5% in annual total pharmaceutical expenditure (Moreno-Torres et al. 2011). This 
might be explained by evolving drug therapies; by the time drugs approach the off­
patent state, new treatments have already started entering the market, often in sig­
nificantly higher prices. In addition, while even significant decreases in prices can 
be achieved, the overall share of the products included in the reference price sys­
tem, relative to the total pharmaceutical expenditures, is often low and therefore only 
moderate total savings are accumulated. 
In six of the included studies, a therapeutic reference price system was adopted, in 
nine a generic reference price system, and in one study both systems. In the study 
where both systems were evaluated (Grootendorst et al. 2005), the therapeutic refer­
ence price system generated larger relative decreases in drug expenditure level. This 
is potentially explained by the pre-policy price difference of products included in 
the same reference groups; the broader the groups are, the more likely there is to be 
substantial price differences between the grouped products. Therefore, also larger 
decreases in total expenditure can be achieved. 
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 7 Rationale of the study 
Pharmaceutical expenditures rose in a rapid pace during the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Soon thereafter, most European economies were faced with a financial down­
turn and, consequently, a need to cut down public expenditures on pharmaceuticals 
was evident (Leopold et al. 2014). This was accurate also in Finland where antide­
pressants and antipsychotics were, in terms of value, among the most rapidly grow­
ing pharmaceutical groups. However, studies analysing the exact reasons behind the 
overall growth trend and specifically the antidepressant and antipsychotic growth 
trend in Finland were missing. Understanding the reasons behind pharmaceutical 
expenditures and its growth is vital in evaluating the success of taken cost contain­
ment methods, which makes it an important subject for research. 
According to existing literature, reference price systems are associated with decreases 
in the prices of products subject to the system. However, the size of the impact dif­
fers between systems and drug groups. In the existing literature, the focus has mainly 
been on cardiovascular, antihypertensive and antiulcerant drugs (Acosta et al. 2014) 
while there are no studies assessing the impact of reference pricing on antipsychotic 
drugs, one of the drug groups with the fastest growth trends. Therefore, it was consid­
ered an important drug group for research. Later on, in order to get a more general­
ized picture, the study was expanded to include other drug groups. 
In existing literature, there are no studies where the impact of generic substitution 
has been isolated from the impact of reference pricing. This assessment would be 
important from both a theoretical and a policymaking perspective. As generic sub­
stitution and reference pricing were implemented separately in Finland, isolating the 
impacts from each other was possible. Furthermore, several studies have investigated 
the impact of a reference price system on prices and expenditures (Ghislandi et al. 
2013; Acosta et al. 2014; Kaiser et al. 2014; Kaiser and Mendez 2015), and some on 
health and the use of healthcare services (Schneeweiss et al. 2003; Stargardt 2009). 
However, relatively little is known about the impact of reference price systems on 
market structure and competition within the market, or about the evolution of the 
system. It is known from other health care reforms that an impact tends to wane as 
time passes. This was considered an important issue to investigate also in regard to 
reference price systems. 
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8	 Aims of the study 
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of a reference price system on 
prices and the competitiveness of the market. A specific focus is on a pharmaceutical 
group where the growth in expenditure before the implementation of the reference 
price system was especially high, namely antipsychotics. In this thesis, the impact 
of reference pricing on competition is reflected upon through perfect competition 
conditions. 
The more specific aims of the four substudies were as follows: 
i.	 To analyse the factors behind growing antipsychotic and antidepressant costs in 
outpatient care in Finland before the implementation of a reference price system 
(Publication I). 
ii.	 To analyse the short-term and the medium-to-long-term impact of the imple­
mentation of a reference price system on antipsychotic prices. The additional im­
pact of reference pricing on previously implemented generic substitution is also 
assessed. (Publications II and III.) 
iii.	 To analyse the impact of a reference price system on prices, competition and mar­
ket structure of 12 different active substances (Publication IV). 
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9 Materials and methods 
9.1 Data sources and study designs 
The data for this study was collected retrospectively from Kela’s prescription register 
and the official price lists of pharmaceutical products. The prescription register is 
maintained by Kela and it contains information on medicine purchases reimbursed 
under the National Health Insurance scheme. The register extensively covers the 
prescription medication consumption in outpatient care in Finland. For example, 
the register covers well over 90% of the ambulatory consumption of antipsychotics. 
For each reimbursed purchase, the prescription register contains detailed informa­
tion about the patient (e.g. unique personal identification code, age, gender, place of 
residence), the purchased product (e.g. the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) 
code, the Nordic commodity number, the tradename, marketing authorisation hold­
er, strength, form), costs (e.g. the total costs and the reimbursement part of the costs, 
reference prices), reimbursement categories, the number of packages and defined 
daily doses (DDDs) purchased, whether the product is included in generic substitu­
tion or reference pricing, and whether the patient or the physician have rejected the 
substitution. The concept of DDD was developed for drug consumption statistics, 
and it represents the typical daily dose for a drug when it is used for its main indica­
tion in adults (WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodolgy 2018). As 
the prescription register does not include information on the actual prescribed dos­
ages, DDDs are used as a proxy for the daily dosage. 
Kela also maintains the official pharmacy price list. Companies that have products 
subject to price notification under the reference price system give quarterly price 
notifications to Kela. These price notifications are used to determine reference prices. 
Additional price notifications can be given every two weeks. The pharmacy price list 
also contains the prices of products not subject to the reference price system. (Kela 
2017a.) 
The prescription register was used as a data source in all four publications. While the 
study period differed between the publications, the total timeframe of the retrieved 
prescription register data span from January 1999 to October 2013. In the fourth 
publication, a pharmacy price list (from March 2009 to October 2013) was also used. 
In the first publication, the studied medicine groups were antipsychotics and antide­
pressants as a whole. In the second publication, the antipsychotics clozapine, olan­
zapine, quetiapine and risperidone were studied in more detail. All four active sub­
stances were included in the reference price system in April 2009. Clozapine and 
risperidone had been included in generic substitution before inclusion in the refer­
ence price system, clozapine in January 2006 and risperidone in January 2008. For 
each active substance, the most used substitution group was identified and selected. 
In the third publication, olanzapine, quetiapine and risperidone were studied along 
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with a control group, aripiprazole, an antipsychotic drug not subject to either generic 
substitution or the reference price system. 
The twelve active substances studied in the fourth publication were included in ge­
neric substitution and the reference price system simultaneously between April 2009 
and October 2010. Of these, the antipsychotics olanzapine and quetiapine, were in­
cluded into the schemes in 2009. The remaining 10 active substances were included 
in the schemes in 2010. Also in this study, the most used substitution group for each 
active substance was identified and selected. 
9.2 Statistical methods 
In order to study the research questions described in Chapter 8, statistical multi­
variate models with selected explanatory variables were developed for each research 
question. The research questions, data and used statistical methods for each publica­
tion are presented in Table 5 (p. 48). 
9.2.1 Decomposition analysis of factors behind growing pharmaceutical costs
(Publication I) 
To analyse the factors behind growing pharmaceutical costs, a decomposition model 
was formed. In the model, the realized total costs (Totcost) of a drug class (e.g. ATC 
group X) in any year (t) are explained by four factors. The four explanatory factors 
are: (1) the size of the population (Pop), (2) the proportion of patients per population 
(Pat/pop), (3) the average amounts consumed per patient measured as defined daily 
doses (DDD/Pat), and (4) the average cost per one day of treatment (Cost/DDD). 
Formally, the model can be expressed as: 
TotcostXt = Popt × (PatXt/Popt) × (DDDXt/PatXt ) × (CostXt/DDDXt) (1) 
The changes in the four factors affecting the cost growth and their relative effect on 
the cost growth were analysed. The relative effect of each factor was calculated by 
dividing the growth (%) of this factor by the sum of the changes (%) of all the factors 
with a positive growth trend. Factors with a negative growth trend were not assessed. 
9.2.2 Segmented linear regression analysis of an interrupted time series (Publications II 
and III) 
In an interrupted time series, data is collected at multiple time points before and after 
an intervention. In segmented regression analysis, the time series is divided into pre- 
and post-intervention segments. The model estimates the level and the trend of the 
outcome of interest in the pre-intervention segment and then estimates the changes 
in level and trend in the subsequent post-intervention segment or segments. (Wagner 
et al. 2002; Zhang et al. 2009.) This can be expressed as: 
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= β0 + β1 × timet + β2 × interventiont + β3 × time after interventiont + εt (2)Yt 
In the model, Y is the outcome of interest in time point t. Time is a continuous vari­
able indicating time points at time t from the start of the observation period. Inter­
vention is an indicator for time t, coded 0 before the intervention and 1 after it. Time
after intervention receives a value of 0 before the intervention and is a continuous 
variable indicating time points after the intervention. β0 estimates the baseline level 
of the outcome. β1 estimates the baseline trend, that is, the change occurring with 
each time point before the intervention. β2 estimates the level of change in the out­
come immediately after the intervention. β3 estimates the change in the trend of the 
outcome after the intervention, compared with the trend before the intervention. ε is
the error term. 
The results can be presented as parameter estimates and as absolute and relative dif­
ferences between estimated post-intervention values at given time points compared 
with estimated values had the intervention not been implemented. 
The model can also specify more than one intervention or change point. A model 
with two interventions would be: 
Yt = β0 + β1 × timet + β2 × intervention1t + β3 × time after intervention1t + 
β4 × intervention2t + time after intervention2t + εt (3) 
The design can be further strengthened by adding a control group. In this design, the 
model can also specify more than one intervention or change points. A model with 
one intervention and a control group would be: 
Yt = β0 + β1 × timet + β2 × interventiont + β3 × time after interventiont + β∆0C + 
β∆1C × timet + β∆2C × interventiont + β∆3C × time after interventiont + εt + εCt (4) 
Here, ∆ denotes the estimated difference between the intervention group and the 
control group. For example, β∆0 estimates the difference between the intervention 
group and the control group in the baseline level. C is an indicator for group, coded 0 
for the intervention group and 1 for the control group. 
In this study, interrupted time series design and segmented linear regression analy­
sis were used to estimate the effect of the implementation of generic substitution 
and a reference price system on the daily cost of antipsychotics, measured as cost 
per DDD. In the dataset, there were 39 monthly pre-reference pricing time points in 
both the short-term and the medium-to-long-term models. For risperidone, the 39 
months before reference pricing could be further divided into 24 months before and 
15 months after the introduction of generic substitution. Therefore, generic substitu­
tion and reference pricing were included as separate interventions in the risperidone 
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model. In the short-term analysis, there were 12 monthly post-reference pricing time 
points and in the medium-to-long-term analysis 30 monthly post-reference pricing 
time points. Aripiprazole, an antipsychotic not subject to generic substitution or ref­
erence pricing, was added to the medium-to-long-term model as a control group. 
As error terms may be correlated in time series data, a Durbin-Watson test was ap­
plied. Autocorrelation was detected in all of the datasets, and thus autoregressive er­
ror models were used to estimate the regression parameters with control of autocor­
relation. The autoregressive error model is given by: 
v = −φ1 vt−1 − … − φ  vt−n + εt εt~IN(0, σ2) (5)t n
Here, the error term v consists of an autoregressive error part − φ1νt−1 – …. − φnνt−n 
and a random error part εt. 
In addition, the normality and homoscedasticity of the residuals were checked by 
statistical tests and a graphic analysis of residuals was performed. While statistical 
tests supported the assumption of heteroscedasticity in the olanzapine data, the scat­
ter plot of times and residuals suggested the possibility of heteroscedasticity in the 
variable time. Thus, a model without a time variable was also fitted for the olanzapine 
data. Furthermore, an abrupt increase in the daily cost of olanzapine was seen in 
the medium-to-long term data, 15 months after the implementation of the reference 
price system. This increase, which was not caused by any health policy intervention, 
was included in the olanzapine medium-to-long term model as a second change 
point, the first being the implementation of reference pricing. 
A departure from the assumption of the homoscedasticity of the residuals was de­
tected in the risperidone data. An outlier was found to be the source of the hetero­
scedasticity. The outlier was identified as the month preceding the implementation 
of generic substitution, which implies that the manufacturers were anticipating the 
forthcoming reform. A dummy variable estimating the pre-effect on generic substitu­
tion was constructed for the risperidone model. The confidence intervals for absolute 
and relative changes in the daily cost were calculated using bootstrap methods. 
9.2.3 Price competition analysis and market concentration (Publication IV) 
A regression model was built to analyse the impact of the reference price system on 
price competition in the generic market sector in Finland. Six explanatory factors 
were used to analyse the impact of the reference price system on prices (Price) in 
any reference price period (t): inclusion in the reference price system (RPS), time 
from inclusion in the reference price system (time), number of competitors (no), the 
market share of the market leader (dom), patients’ copayment rate (cop) and firms’ 
experience of the markets under the reference price system (exp). For each substitu­
tion group a price index was used to follow the price developments for a three-year 
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follow up period. The base period was the month before the substitution group was 
included in the reference price system. For the following periods, the indices were 
based on the reference price of the substitution group in question. Statistical tests 
and graphic analyses were performed to detect any deviations from the assumptions 
of linear regression. As multicollinearity was detected, the time variable was squared 
(time2). Autocorrelation was also detected and, thus, the error term (v) consists of an 
autoregressive and a random error part. The model can be expressed as: 
Pricet = β0 + βRPSt + βtimet 2 + βnot + βdomt + βcopt + βexpt + vt (6) 
Furthermore, the competitive conditions of the market were measured with the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). The index combines the number of competi­
tors (no) and their respective market shares into a single concentration index. In this 
study, the HHI for each active substance is calculated as follows: 
2 
i= _ q (7)HHI ∑noi=1( ) active substance A 
qi is the number of purchases of company i’s product in the most used substitution 
group in the active substance in question and A is the sum of all purchases in the 
qsubstitution group in question. Therefore _i  is the market share of company i in the A 
most used substitution group of the active substance in question. The index receives 
values ranging from 0, which indicates perfect competition, to 10,000 which in turn 
indicates monopoly. The lower the value is, the higher is the competitiveness of the 
market. When the index is lower than 1,500 the market is considered unconcen­
trated. An index between 1,500 and 2,500 means the market is moderately concen­
trated, and with an index above 2,500, the market is described as highly concentrated. 
(US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 2010.) 
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10 Results 
10.1 Factors associated with pharmaceutical cost growth (Publication I) 
From 1999 through 2005, the cost growth of reimbursed purchases was 211% for 
antipsychotics and 19% for antidepressants. In euros, the increase was from 29 mil­
lion euros to 90 million euros for antipsychotics and from 54 million euros to 65 mil­
lion euros for antidepressants. Deflating the costs to 2005 money, decreased the cost 
growth of reimbursed purchases of antipsychotics and antidepressants to 183% and 
8.5%, respectively. At the same time, the proportion of antipsychotic users in the total 
population decreased from 2.4% to 2.2% while the proportion of antidepressant users 
increased from 4.8% to 6.3%. However, the amount of defined daily doses purchased 
increased in both groups. (Figure 5.) 
Figure 5. Reimbursed antipsychotic and antidepressant purchases in Finland 1999–2005. Patients, defin­
ed daily doses (DDDs) and total costs presented as indices (1999 = 100). 
Index 
350 
300 
Antipsychotics, patients 
250 Antipsychotics, DDDs 
200 Antipsychotics, total costs 
150 Antidepressants, patients 
100 
Antidepressants, DDDs 
Antidepressants, total costs 
50 
0 
Drug choices changed notably between 1999 and 2005, especially among antipsy­
chotics. In 1999, second-generation antipsychotics accounted for 22% of the total 
consumption, while in 2005 their proportion had increased to 62%. In 2005, the 
most consumed antipsychotics were olanzapine and risperidone. The shift to new 
and more expensive second-generation antipsychotics also led to an increase in the 
mean daily cost of treatment, which more than doubled during the study years. In 
1999, the mean daily cost of antipsychotic treatment was 1.37 euros while by 2005 it 
had risen to 2.94 euros. 
Citalopram was the most consumed antidepressant throughout the study period. In 
the beginning of the study period, the consumption of other, newer antidepressants 
was low but it increased rapidly during the study years. However, contrary to antipsy­
chotics, the mean daily cost of antidepressant treatment went down from 1.06 euros 
to 0.79 euros. This was due to the implementation of generic substitution in 2003, 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
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which made the price competition for antidepressants possible. Antipsychotics were 
not included in generic substitution during the study years. 
When analysing the factors affecting the growth in costs, we found that the two drug 
groups differed considerably. For antipsychotics, about 80% of the cost growth result­
ed from the rise in the mean daily cost of treatment while the increase in patients per 
population accounted for about 60% of the antidepressant cost growth. The growth 
in the size of the population had only a marginal effect on the cost growth while the 
amounts consumed per patient increased in both drug classes. The relative effect of 
these increases on the cost growth was about 19% for antipsychotics and about 38% 
for antidepressants. (Table 6.) 
Table 6. Factors affecting the drug costs for antipsychotics and antidepressants in Finland, their change 
from 1999 to 2005, and their relative effects on cost growth. 
Factor 
Antipsychotics Antidepressants 
Change (%) 
Relative effect on 
cost growth (%) Change (%) 
Relative effect on 
cost growth (%) 
Population 1.6 0.9 1.6 3.1 
Patients per population −6.7 decreased 31.0 59.2 
DDDs per patient 34.8 19.3 19.7 37.7 
Average cost per DDD 143.6 79.8 −25.2 decreased 
Total 100 100 
DDD = defined daily dose. 
While the factors affecting cost growth varied considerably between the two drug 
groups, even within the groups, there were some differences in the age- and gender 
specific cost growth drivers. For antipsychotics, the increase in patients per popula­
tion was the most significant factor affecting the cost growth in the age group of 
under 20-year-olds. For men in this age group, the relative effect was about 48% and 
for women about 40%. For all other age groups, the most important factor affecting 
the antipsychotics cost growth was the cost per one day of treatment. For antidepres­
sants, the increase in patients per population explained from 57% to 64% of the cost 
growth in the age group of under 40-year-olds. In older age groups, the increase in 
the size of the population, patients per population and amounts consumed per pa­
tient each explained approximately one third of the antidepressant cost growth. 
10.2 The impact of the reference price system on pharmaceutical costs
(Publications II and III) 
The impact of the implementation of reference pricing on the daily cost of the an­
tipsychotics olanzapine, quetiapine, risperidone and clozapine was analysed in Pub­
lications II and III. Olanzapine, quetiapine and risperidone were included in both 
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short-term and medium-to-long-term impact analyses, clozapine only in the short­
term analysis. Risperidone was also used to analyse the additional impact of refer­
ence pricing on previously implemented generic substitution. 
10.2.1 Medium-to-long-term impact of implementing the reference price system 
There was a substantial decrease in the daily cost of antipsychotic medication af­
ter the implementation of reference pricing in Finland. In the medium-to-long-term 
analysis, the daily cost of the studied antipsychotics was 24.6% to 50.6% lower than 
it would have been were reference pricing not implemented. In absolute terms, this 
meant a reduction of approximately €1.00 for olanzapine, €1.97 for quetiapine and 
€3.09 for risperidone. (Table 7; Figure 6, p. 53.) 
Table 7. Absolute and relative effects of the interventions on daily cost 12 and 30 months after the imple­
mentation of reference pricing, estimated from the regression models. 
Active sub­
stance 
Daily cost with 
intervention/-s, 
euros 
Daily cost without 
intervention/-s,
euros 
Absolute change, 
euros 
(95% CI) 
Relative change, % 
(95% CI) 
12 
months 
30 
months 
12 
months 
30 
months 
12 
months 
30 
months 
12 
months 
30 
months 
Clozapine, 
RPS 
1.5014 . 2.1430 . –0.6416 
(−0.8355, 
−0.4461) 
. −29.9 
(−37.6, 
−21.8) 
. 
Olanzapine, 
both GS and 
RPS 
1.5509 3.0579 4.6046 4.0535 −3.0537 
(−3.3425,
 −2.7660) 
−0.9956 
(−1.2463, 
−0.7702) 
−66.3 
(−70.7, 
−61.8) 
−24.6 
(−29.8, 
−19.6) 
Quetiapine, 
both GS and 
RPS 
3.0917 1.9168 4.7482 3.8834 −1.6565 
(−1.9443, 
−1.3670) 
−1.9666 
(−2.2959, 
−1.6386) 
−34.9 
(−39.8, 
−29.7) 
−50.6 
(−56.0, 
−44.6) 
Risperidone, 
both GS and 
RPS 
4.2045 4.0203 7.4093 7.1070 −3.2048 
(−3.4034, 
−3.0069) 
−3.0867 
(−3.3622, 
−2.8090) 
−43.3 
(−44.9, 
−41.5) 
−43.4 
(−45.6, 
−41.1) 
Risperidone, 
only GS 
4.9940a 4.0487b 7.4093a 7.1070b −2.4153a 
(−2.5919, 
−2.2331) 
−3.0583b 
(−3.4834, 
−2.6319) 
−32.6a 
(−34.4, 
−30.8) 
−43.0b 
(−48.4, 
−37.6) 
GS = generic substitution, RPS = reference price system, CI = confidence interval. 
a Time since implementation of GS: 27 months. 
b Time since implementation of GS: 45 months. 
For olanzapine and quetiapine, there was a downward month-to-month trend pre­
ceding the implementation of reference pricing, followed with a substantial drop in 
the level of the daily cost immediately after implementation. While the month-to­
month downward trend accelerated for both active substances, there was an abrupt 
increase of approximately €1.50 in the daily cost of olanzapine fifteen months af­
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Aripiprazole, observed 
GS = generic substitution, RPS = reference price system, MAH = market authorization holder.
 
a The observed daily cost is presented also for the control antipsychotic aripiprazole. For clozapine, the curve is based on short­
term analysis and for the other antipsychotics, on medium-to-long-term analysis.
 
For risperidone, there was an upwards month-to-month trend before the implemen­
tation of generic substitution which resulted in a drop in the level of the daily cost. 
This drop was slightly less than the pre-effect one month before the implementation 
of generic substitution. A second drop in the level of the daily cost of risperidone was 
seen 15 months later when risperidone was included in the reference price system. 
However, while the month-to-month trend turned in a downward direction after 
the implementation of generic substitution, it reverted to an upward trend after the 
implementation of the reference price system in the medium-to-long-term model. 
(Table 9, p. 54.) 
ter the implementation of reference pricing, and the month-to-month trend shifted 
from a downward to an upward direction. (Table 8, p. 54.) Changes in the number 
of companies operating in the olanzapine market explained the phenomenon. Until 
the implementation of reference pricing, one company had, in practice, a monopoly 
position in the market. At the implementation of reference pricing, there were four 
companies in the olanzapine market, though one soon exited. The three remaining 
companies were engaged in price competition until June 2010 when patent protection 
issues forced one of the companies to exit the market. The two remaining companies 
raised their prices immediately to the maximum wholesale price of the remaining ge­
neric product. After the originator brand’s patent expired internationally in October 
2011, more companies entered the market and price competition restarted. 
Figure 6. The observed daily cost of olanzapine, quetiapine, risperidone and clozapine, and their predict­
ed daily cost without the implementation of generic substitution and the reference price systema. 
€ 
8 
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6 
5 
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Olanzapine, observed 
Olanzapine, predicted 
without GS and RPS, 
and MAHs’ price increase 
Quetiapine, observed 
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without GS and RPS 
Risperidone, observed 
Risperidone, predicted 
without RPS 
Risperidone, predicted 
without GS and RPS 
Clozapine, observed 
Clozapine, predicted 
without RPS 
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Table 8. The impact of reference pricing on the daily cost of olanzapine and quetiapine in Finland 12 and 
30 months after the implementation of reference pricinga. 
Variable 
Olanzapine Quetiapine 
12 months 30 months 12 months 30 months 
Coefficient
(€) 
Coefficient
(€) 
Relative to 
aripiprazole 
Coefficient
(€) 
Coefficient
(€) 
Relative to 
aripiprazole 
Baseline level 4.9495 4.6485 NS 6.0130 5.6360 −0.9923 
Monthly trend before 
reference pricing −0.0068 −0.0086 NS −0.0248 −0.0254 0.0179 
Level change after
reference pricing −1.5789 −1.5251 1.5812 −1.0493 −1.1326 1.1633 
Change in monthly
trend after reference 
pricing −0.1229 −0.0893 0.0908 −0.0506 −0.0278 0.0211 
Level change after
price increase . 1.4940 −1.5236 . . . 
Change in monthly
trend after price 
increase . 0.1143 −0.1322 . . . 
a 30-month results are also presented relative to the control antipsychotic aripiprazole. 
Table 9. The impact of separately implemented generic substitution and reference pricing on the daily cost
of risperidone in Finland 12 and 30 months after the implementation of reference pricinga. 
Variable 
12 months 30 months 
Coefficient (€) Coefficient (€) 
Relative to 
aripiprazole 
Baseline level 6.2567 5.8167 −1.0179 
Monthly trend before generic substitution 0.0226 0.0187 −0.0380 
Pre-effect to generic substitution −1.4291 −1.2413 1.2970 
Level change after generic substitution −1.3164 −1.1233 1.1408 
Change in monthly trend after generic substitution −0.0407 −0.0430 0.0643 
Level change after reference pricing −0.7895 −0.8114 0.9266 
Change in monthly trend after reference pricing NS 0.0261 −0.0489 
a 30-month results are also presented relative to control active substance aripiprazole. 
10.2.2 Short-term impact of implementing the reference price system 
After 12 months of the implementation of the reference price system, the daily cost 
of the studied antipsychotics (clozapine, olanzapine, quetiapine and risperidone) was 
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29.9% to 66.3% lower than it would have been were reference pricing not imple­
mented. While the reduction of the daily cost for olanzapine was high, 66.3%, in the 
short-term model, the reduction was much less, 22.6%, in the medium-to-long-term 
model. This was due to changes in the number of companies in the market. For que­
tiapine, the reduction increased from 34.9% to 50.6%. As for risperidone, the reduc­
tion in daily cost was almost the same in both short-term and medium-to-long-term 
analyses, a little over 43%. (Table 7.) 
Clozapine was only included in the short-term model. One year after the reference 
price system was implemented, the daily cost of clozapine was 29.9% lower than it 
would have been were reference pricing not implemented (Table 7, Figure 6). There 
was a slight downwards pre-reference pricing trend in the daily cost of clozapine, fol­
lowed by a fall in the level of the daily cost immediately after the implementation and 
an acceleration in the month-to-month decreasing trend (Table 10). 
Table 10. The impact of reference pricing on the daily cost of clozapine in Finland 12 months after the 
implementation of reference pricing. 
Variable Coefficient (€) 
Baseline level 2.3008 
Monthly trend before reference pricing −0.0031 
Level change after reference pricing −0.4676 
Change in monthly trend after reference pricing −0.0145 
10.2.3 The additional impact of reference pricing on previously implemented generic
substitution 
As risperidone was included in generic substitution and reference pricing at separate 
times during the study period, it was possible to isolate the impact of generic substitu­
tion from the subsequent impact of reference pricing on the daily cost of risperidone. 
The baseline daily cost of risperidone was €5.82 in the medium-to-long-term model. 
2.5 years after the implementation of reference pricing, the daily cost was estimated 
to be €4.02, which represents an absolute reduction of €3.09 and a relative reduction 
of 43.3%. Had only generic substitution been implemented, the daily cost was esti­
mated to have been €4.05, representing an absolute reduction of €3.06 and a relative 
reduction of 43.0%. Therefore, the additional impact of the separately implemented 
reference pricing on previously implemented generic substitution was very low in 
the medium-to-long-term. (Table 7, Figure 6.) Also in the short-term, most of the 
decrease in the daily cost of risperidone was generated by generic substitution, over 
75% of the total decrease observed at the end of the first year. After 2.5 years, the 
share was over 99%. 
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10.3 Competition and market structure in pharmaceutical markets under
the reference price system (Publication IV) 
In the fourth publication, the data was extended so that it included more pharmaceu­
tical groups. In addition, the time span was extended to include the first three years 
of the reference price system. 
There was a drop in the price index of all of the studied substitution groups after the 
active substance was included in reference pricing. After the first year, the average 
price index was 50.7, after the second year 37.9 and after the third year 36.9. After 
the third year, the lowest price index, 4.6, was observed with olanzapine while also 
sildenafil and clopidogrel had low price indices, 12.6 and 15.7, respectively. While 
the price index for olanzapine varied considerably between the three years, the price 
indices for clopidogrel and sildenafil exhibited constant low levels throughout the 
three years. Both clopidogrel and sildenafil had high global sales before generic en­
try, which could explain the active and sustained price decreases. On the other hand, 
for example, rosuvastatin had higher reimbursed sales in Finland before inclusion 
in reference pricing than either clopidogrel or sildenafil, and it still showed more 
restrained price decreases than the other two. One year after being included in refer­
ence pricing, the price index for rosuvastatin was 62.5, after two years 52.5 and after 
three years 47.2. The second year’s patent protection issues explain the sharp increase 
in the price index for olanzapine. However, after the originator brand’s patent expired 
internationally at the end of 2011, two and a half years later than in Finland, more 
competitors entered the market and price competition started again. (Table 11.) 
Table 11. The price index one, two and three years after inclusion in the reference price system. 
Active substance First year Second year Third year 
Celiprolol 89.6 39.9 23.9 
Clopidogrel 16.1 13.1 15.7 
Escitalopram 49.0 40.7 38.4 
Lercandipine 52.9 51.4 61.8 
Olanzapine 35.0 68.8 4.6 
Quetiapine 35.8 24.9 28.6 
Rosuvastatin 65.2 52.5 47.2 
Sildenafil 17.8 9.3 12.6 
Temozolamide 49.6 45.7 44.2 
Tibolone 63.6 63.6 64.1 
Timolol in combination 68.7 60.9 61.4 
Valsartan 65.0 44.0 40.2 
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The pharmaceutical markets remained highly concentrated in the reference price 
system. During the three-year follow-up period, moderately concentrated markets 
were observed in only two substitution groups, clopidogrel and sildenafil. Besides 
olanzapine, they were also the substitution groups where the most notable price de­
creases occurred. The average HHI for the twelve studied active substances was 4,790 
for the first year, 5,200 for the second year, and 5,610 for the third year (Figure 7). 
The market share of the market leader remained very high throughout the three-year 
follow-up period. In only three out of twelve substitution groups, the market leader 
had a market share below 40% at some point during the follow-up period. The market 
share of the market leader ranged between 36% and 97% (mean 67%) during the first 
year, between 32% and 93% (mean 65%) during the second year, and between 44% 
and 96% (mean 67%) during the third year. This is despite the fact that the average 
number of competitors within a substitution group grew from the first year’s 4.8 to 
the second year’s 5.2 and finally to the third year’s 5.7 (Figure 8, p. 58). 
Figure 7. Market concentration according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) one, two and three years
after inclusion in reference pricinga. 
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a The blue bars indicate moderately concentrated markets (HHI from 1,500 to 2,500). Grey indicates highly concentrated markets 
(HHI above 2,500). HHI below 1,500 (red line) indicate competitive markets. 
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Figure 8. Price indices and the number of competitors (marketing authorisation holders, MAHs) in the 
market after one, two and three years of inclusion in the reference price systema. 
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a The size of the bubble indicates the level of concentration within the market. The larger the bubble, the higher the concentration. 
       
 
59 Pharmaceutical expenditures, the reference price system and competition in the pharmaceutical market
A regression model was constructed to analyse the impact of different factors on the 
price development of products included in the reference price system. The actual 
inclusion in the reference price system had the most notable impact on prices, a drop 
of almost 30%. In addition, the number of competitors in the market had an impact; 
each entry of a new generic decreased the price by around 4.5%. At the same time, 
the dominant position of the market leader and companies’ experience of markets 
under the reference price system had an increasing impact on prices. The later an ac­
tive substance was included in the reference price system, the higher the price level 
remained. In other words, each passed quarter increased the price level of a product, 
once it was included in the reference price system, by 2.9%. (Table 12.) 
Table 12. The impact of the factors affecting the price development of products included in the reference 
price system. 
Independent variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant 87.5088 <0.0001 
Inclusion in the RPS −29.6126 <0.0001 
Time2 from inclusion in the RPS −0.0890 0.0002 
Number of competitors −4.5159 <0.0001 
Dominant position of the market leader 0.1486 0.0158 
Copayment rate −0.1181 0.0600 
Companies’ experience of the market 2.9349 0.0041 
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 11 Discussion 
In the past decades, pharmaceutical expenditures have grown rapidly in Finland. 
Reasons behind the growth trend vary between drug groups and active substances. 
This study found that the main reason for the antipsychotic cost growth was the in­
creased use of more expensive treatments while the antidepressant cost growth was 
mainly due to the increased number of patients treated. Antipsychotic costs contin­
ued to grow until the introduction of reference pricing. While the implementation of 
generic substitution had curbed the antidepressant cost growth for some years, the 
costs had also taken an upturn again before the implementation of reference pricing. 
After reference pricing was introduced, both antipsychotic and antidepressant costs 
were decreased. While the costs have since grown, the total costs were still well below 
the pre-reference-pricing level in real terms in 2016. 
The implementation of the reference price system decreased the daily cost of anti­
psychotics both in the short term and in the medium-to-long term. The same result 
applied when other pharmaceutical groups were included in the analysis. However, 
the size of the impact varied between active substances. Furthermore, the addition­
al impact of reference pricing on previously implemented generic substitution re­
mained low in this study. When analysing the factors associated with prices, this re­
sult was affirmed as most of the decreases in prices resulted from the actual inclusion 
in the reference price system rather than efficient competition. This is due to Finnish 
pricing regulations that require the maximum wholesale price for generic products 
to be lower than the on-patent original product’s price. During the study years, the 
required minimum reduction at market entry was 40%. Therefore, much of the ob­
served price decreases result from regulation. Similar results regarding regulation 
were observed in the UK where a fall in generic prices after a pricing regulation revi­
sion in the mid-1990’s was deemed to be the result of regulatory action rather than 
enhanced price competition (Kay and Baines 2000). 
However, some competitive effects of the implementation of reference pricing were 
detected; the number of competitors within a market had a decreasing impact on 
prices. As the market share of the market leader and the concentration of the market 
remained very high despite the number of competitors, it appears that the presence of 
potential competition still had an impact on price competition. In fact, Bergman and 
Rudholm (2003) found that pharmaceutical prices in Sweden fell in both response to 
potential (i.e. loss of exclusivity rights) and actual entry of competition. The presence 
of potential competition lead to a similar reduction, from 4% to 8%, in prices, than 
the entrance of an additional competitor. (Bergman and Rudholm 2003.) 
Generic pharmaceutical markets are highly concentrated in Finland. This is despite 
the fact that in most cases the number of companies within the market is numer­
ous enough to enable effective competition. In fact, it appears that the number of 
companies is not the main consideration in Finland but rather the stable position of 
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the few established companies with substantial market control. Smaller and more ag­
gressively pricing companies did not typically gain a significant market share, if any, 
even if their product was the only one at or below the reference price. In generic refer­
ence pricing, products can be regarded as homogeneous. While some residual brand 
loyalty exists, the difficulty of smaller companies to access the distribution channel 
seems to be a contributing factor. 
Pharmacies have a significant role in the diffusion of generic products and in steering 
demand. In systems where the pharmacies’ reimbursement is based on the dispensed 
products’ retail price, like in Finland, there is a monetary incentive for pharmacies 
to dispense higher-priced products (Garattini and Salvioni 1996). Even more im­
portantly, it appears that pharmacies show preference to products from larger, estab­
lished companies, which makes it difficult for newcomers and smaller companies to 
gain market share. On the other hand, it has been alleged that the real availability of 
some products is unreliable. As the real availability of products from the wholesaler 
is not public information, it is difficult to evaluate this factor. In general, access to 
wholesalers can also act as a barrier to entry. In Finland, the wholesalers’ mark-up is 
not regulated. However, it can be assumed that larger companies have an advantage 
over small ones in this sense. Besides company related factors, Finland’s geographical 
location can also act as a barrier to entry or at least diminish the attractiveness of the 
market to new entrants. 
Literature proposes that reference pricing does not provide an incentive for pharma­
ceutical companies or pharmacies to sell products below the reference price (Danzon 
and Chao 2000). When examining the price notifications in Finland at the last refer­
ence price quarter of 2017, it was observed that about a third of all products subject to 
the reference price system were priced to their maximum wholesale prices and thus 
competitive gains were limited. Also, the length of price notification periods may 
influence companies’ willingness to engage in price competition in Finland. While 
reference prices are set for three-month periods, companies can change their prices 
every two weeks. This relatively short period allows companies to adopt a watchful 
waiting type of pricing strategy instead of active price competition. 
The impact of health care reforms is typically at its greatest right after implementa­
tion, and as time passes, the impact wanes (Altman and Levitt 2002). In this study, it 
was also observed that as companies gained experience of markets under the refer­
ence price system, the impact of the system on prices diminished. The later an active 
substance was included in the reference price system, the higher the price level re­
mained. Nevertheless, the reference price system brings down the prices of products 
subject to the system. The effectiveness of the system depends on the implemented 
system’s structure. The grouping of products, the length of reference price periods, 
and the setting of reference prices are examples of factors that can influence the ef­
fectiveness of the system. 
Pharmaceutical expenditures, the reference price system and competition in the pharmaceutical market 62 
A limitation of this study is that the used data has only a limited number of active 
substances. Therefore, the results should be generalized with caution. While a control 
group not subject to reference pricing was used in one of the studies, the used meth­
ods have limitations in identifying underlying, not reference-price-system related, 
factors influencing pharmaceutical cost and price development. Furthermore, it is 
not possible to draw any conclusions on whether the reference price system had any 
impact on the use of medicines or other health care services. 
Pharmaceutical expenditures, the reference price system and competition in the pharmaceutical market 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Conclusions 
1) The reasons behind rising pharmaceutical expenditures vary between drug 
groups. 
2) The reference price system is associated with decreases in prices in both the short 
and the medium-to-long term. However, the system is vulnerable to, for example, 
changes in the number of companies within the market and there is a risk of silent 
collusion. 
3) The additional impact of the reference price system on previously implemented 
generic substitution is modest, almost non-existent 2.5 years after the implemen­
tation. However, the implementation of the reference price system generated im­
mediate level changes in prices and additional short-term savings were achieved. 
4) Decreases in the prices of products subject to reference pricing result mainly from 
regulatory pricing practices, rather than effective competition. Furthermore, 
companies seem to gain knowledge of markets under the reference price system 
and adjust their pricing practices; the later a product was included in reference 
pricing, the lesser the impact of the system on prices was. 
5) The generic market sector in Finland is highly concentrated. This held true for 
each of the first three years of reference pricing observed in this study. 
12.1 Policy implications 
Based on this study, the following implications for practice can be made: 
1) The impact of pharmaceutical reimbursement system reforms, in line with all 
health care reforms, changes is time. Besides short-term, also long-term evalua­
tions should be made regularly. The ability of the reference price system to in­
fluence prices diminishes with time. This means that there is a constant need to 
revise and fine-tune the implemented measures. 
2) While the number of sellers increases after exclusivity rights are lost, there is 
clearly a chronic problem of too much concentration in the Finnish generic phar­
maceutical market. Further consideration is required both to encourage generic 
entries and to lower the level of concentration in the market. 
3) Due to the market dominance of the few large and established companies, they 
are more able to influence prices than is desirable. This appears to be enforced 
by pharmacies’ stocking and dispensing choices. Besides the currently required 
information on the actual cheapest product within a reference group, pharma­
cies’ obligation to also have the cheapest products in stock should be considered. 
This would require the availability of the alternative products from the wholesaler 
to be transparent. Furthermore, the overall transparency of the pharmaceutical 
distribution chain should be deliberated, and possible barriers of entry should be 
lowered if not abolished. 
4) Further consideration should also be given to the length of reference price periods 
and the frequency of price notifications. The timespan between price notifications 
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is rather short and especially larger, established companies seem to rely on main­
taining their market share even if their first price notification of each reference 
price period is not within the reference price. 
5) Further steps to increase the patients’ level of information regarding prices should 
be contemplated. In addition, physicians’ price-consciousness in prescribing pro­
ducts where generic alternatives are not on the market should be enhanced. 
12.2 Suggestions for further studies 
In light of this study and existing literature, the following suggestions are made for 
future studies: 
1) Future research should study the long-term impact of the reference price system 
on prices and generic market structure. The evaluation should also be extended to 
include more pharmaceutical groups. 
2) The pricing patterns of originator and generic products and subsequent generic 
entry is an important subject for future research. 
3) More research is warranted on the role of pharmacies and wholesalers in price 
competition on the pharmaceutical market. 
4) Future studies should assess whether first mover advantage holds true also in re­
gards to the first generic product entering the market. 
5) The impact of the reference price system on the use of pharmaceuticals should be 
assessed. In addition, the impact on the use of other health care services should be 
evaluated in order to gain information on the overall impact of the reference price 
system on health and health care costs. 
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Appendix
Literature search strategy. 
Database 
Date of search 
Platform or
vendor Search profiles Results 
Cochrane Database of Systematic
Reviews (CDSR) 
Database of Abstracts of Reviews of
Effects (DARE) 
Cochrane Central Register of Con­
trolled Trials (CENTRAL) 
Cochrane Methodology Register (CMR) 
Health Technology Assessment
Database (HTA) 
NHS Economic Evaluation Database 
(NHSEED) 
10 Feb 2017 
The Cochrane 
Library 
1 “reference pricing” or “reference 
price system” or “reference price 
systems”:ti,ab,kw 
2 prices:ti,ab,kw or costs:ti,ab,kw 
1 AND 2 Publication Year from 2011 to 
2017 
8 
(of which 
1 CDSR, 
1 DARE and 
6 CENTRAL) 
PubMed 
2 Oct 2017 
National 
Library of
Medicine, 
USA 
1 ((reference pricing[Text Word]) OR refer­
ence price system[Text Word]) OR reference 
price systems[Text Word] 
2 (prices[Title/Abstract]) OR costs[Title/ 
Abstract] 
3 ((“english”[Language]) 
OR “finnish”[Language]) OR
“swedish”[Language] 
4 1 AND 2 AND 3 AND (“2011”[Date - Publi­
cation] : “3000”[Date - Publication]) 
55 
EMBASE 
2 Oct 2017 
Elsevier 1 ‘reference pricing’ OR ‘reference price 
system’ OR ‘reference price systems’ 
2 prices:ab,ti OR costs:ab,ti 
3 1 AND 2 AND AND [embase]/lim NOT
[medline]/lim AND ([english]/lim OR [finn­
ish]/lim OR [swedish]/lim) 
AND [2011-2017]/py 
136 
EconLit 
2 Oct 2017 
ProQuest 1 (“reference pricing” OR “reference price 
system” OR “reference price systems”) AND
prices 
2 (ti(prices) OR ti(costs) OR ab(prices) OR
ab(costs)) 
3 1 AND 2 AND Publication date: 2011 - 
2017 
17 
PAIS Index 
2 Oct 2017 
ProQuest 1 “reference pricing” OR “reference price 
system” OR “reference price systems” 
2 (ti(prices) OR ab(costs) OR ti(prices) OR
ab(costs)) 
3 1 AND 2 Publication date: 2011–2017 
7 
Sociological Abstracts 
2 Oct 2017 
ProQuest 1 “reference pricing” OR “reference price 
system” OR “reference price systems” 
2 (ti(prices) OR ab(costs) OR ti(prices) OR
ab(costs)) 
3 1 AND 2 Publication date: 2011–2017 
1 
Results: 224 references altogether, after removing duplicates: 183 
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Pharmaceutical prices and expenditures are discussed 
increasingly around the world. Different mechanisms, such as
promoting competition, have been contemplated in an attempt
to contain costs. In this, reference price systems have been 
a widely used method. 
This study aims to examine the impact of a generic reference 
price system on prices, market structure and competition, with 
a special focus on antipsychotics. Furthermore, the additional 
impact of reference pricing over and above the impact of
previously implemented generic substitution is investigated. 
While price decreases were obtained, most of them resulted 
from pharmaceutical pricing regulations rather than effective 
competition. The generic market sector appears highly
concentrated. Furthermore, the additional impact of reference 
pricing on previously implemented generic substitution 
remains modest. 
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